What happens if syria falls

Syria lies between two states which have set a precedent of sectarian violence. In January, a car bomb in Baghdad killed at least 17 people, likely aimed at undermining the Shia-led Iraqi government. Al-Hashemi fled Iraq, was charged with murder, convicted in abstentia, and sentenced to death. This is particularly true given that Syria houses a greater diversity of ethnic and religious peoples than exists in Iraq, providing the opportunity for factionalism and sectarianism to be far greater in Syria.

For more than forty years, the rule of Syria by the Asad family placed Alawites in charge of a country which is approximately three-quarters Sunni. While the international community would certainly prefer the end of Asad rule to correlate with the conclusion of fighting in Syria — a position which the political leaders of the SNC might be coaxed to accept if tempted by an appointment as temporary custodians of power in Syria — it will at best be a struggle to control the varying and often competing factions of Sunni militia leaders on the ground.

To many Sunnis, Asad, hated as he may be personally, embodies only the tip of an Alawite regime which for years systematically and intentionally suppressed Sunnis throughout the country, creating lasting resentment in the community.

The feelings of resentment and hostility many in the Alawite community have toward Syrian Sunnis, and vice versa, has been exponentially exacerbated and largely turned to hatred in the last two years. The youngest generations of Syrian Sunnis are also learning to hate the Alawite sect. A September New York Times article quoted children regarding their feelings toward Alawites and the conflict. Such a legacy threatens to extend sectarian tensions for decades to come as those same generations grow up.

Compounding the problem is that the chances of Sunni fighters declining to take broader revenge and agreeing not to prolong conflict with Alawites and other minority sects becomes less likely the more radicalized the current opposition elements become.

As Jabhat al-Nusra becomes more prominent, moderate Sunni leaders are likely to struggle to prevent reprisal attacks carried out by followers and supporters of the group. Of course, it is this very notion which has the potential to precipitate increasing fissures and ultimately divisions between Sunni moderates and hardliners after the Asad regime falls.

The number of opposition groups fighting on the ground in Syria now registers in the hundreds. In its declaration, the U. The declaration also stated that the group was responsible for more than attacks in Syria since November When the November announcement was made by the United States, almost all Syrian Sunni external leaders rallied to defend Jabhat al-Nusra.

However, that did not prevent the seeds of conflict between jihadists and more moderate opposition elements from forming, a schism which has exacerbated in recent weeks. In April , a potential split emerged between al-Qaida forces in Iraq and Syria. As is the case with many terrorist groups, Jabhat al-Nusra seeks to influence the local populace in part by providing aid and food.

Even if the self-proclaimed emir was exaggerating, independent organizations verify the trend of Syrian fighters increasingly joining radicalized organizations. UN human rights investigators have noted that individuals from upwards of 29 different countries found their way into Syria to fight.

Meanwhile despite international concerns, Jabhat al-Nusra continues ingratiating itself into local Syrian society, including by acting at times as a check against rebels who are engaging in kidnappings and robberies aimed at raising money but terrorizing local communities. In turn, there are signs of increasing tensions between the various opposition elements and Jabhat al-Nusra.

The situation is now very clear. In post-Asad Syria, the split between opposition forces will almost certainly be exacerbated and the conflict between them will turn increasingly violent — their long-term objectives are simply not compatible.

This is not an unknown story, and in fact it is one that continues to play out in Iraq where the Sunni Awakening led tens of thousands of Sunni militia members to go from tenuous allies of al-Qaida to hated foes. While most of the focus surrounding opposition to the Asad regime is between Sunnis and Alawites, minority groups in Syria have significant reasons to be concerned about their long-term security in the country. Portions of the fragmented Syrian Kurdish population are already engaging in the conflict believing it necessary to defend what they view as their territory.

The Christians, long tied to the Asad regime, have little capacity to protect and defend themselves, a concern which is likely increasing at a time when the Asad regime is struggling to retain control. And the Druze remain as they are in Lebanon, Israel, and elsewhere, a predominantly insular population whose concern is less about the state they live in than the welfare of their own community.

All of these groups are facing the tumult of war in Syria now and will have major challenges to overcome post-Asad, especially if the regime is replaced by a government committed to creating an Islamic state. Syrian Kurds find themselves in a tenuous position in which the bloc is probably, first and foremost, loyal to themselves but nevertheless still a community complicated by internal fissures.

For that reason, reporting on Kurdish alliances is at times contradictory. The situation in the northeast also remains volatile following the removal of U. The estimated death toll is , people, but it could actually be much higher. The United Nations Refugee Agency estimates that 5. Even as the conflict winds down, it is unclear when or if they will be able to return.

Once the fighting finally comes to an end, Assad will still face the challenge of rebuilding the country, including areas where he allegedly deployed chemical weapons against his own citizens.

The question of who will foot the bill remains an open one. And when the prospect of conquering Aleppo finally arose in , Iran pressed Moscow not to settle for a deal which would leave the opposition in any part of the city. This will go on. Because of its huge investment so far and its stake in Syria as a secure corridor to Lebanon and Hezbollah, Iran may not be willing to tolerate any opposition area in Syria whatsoever.

And that means it will almost certainly insist on pushing into Idlib, despite the inevitable financial, military and human cost. Beyond the drama over Aleppo city, Turkey has gained more ground than anyone in Syria in the last few months.

That offensive is now trying to drive IS from its last major position in the area, the town of al-Bab. A longtime backer of the opposition and rebels, Turkey has traded in its unqualified support for the anti-regime forces for a balancing with Moscow and Tehran.

All the while, conspicuous by their near-total absence are the Americans. Once the ultimate power throughout the Middle East, they are sidelined. Even after months of Russian manipulation ended in the carnage of Aleppo rather than that outcome, Kerry may well try once more.

As Joshua Landis told me, the Astana peace process, led by the Russians, "is the only one worth anything at the moment. Everyone knows this will not happen. With the demise of IS, Syria's future will continue to be determined by a variety of external players, fighting out their own strategic battles and seeking local advantage. Its initial half-hearted efforts to galvanise a democratic opposition to defeat the Syrian regime failed dramatically.

Its focus has largely been on the defeat of the IS caliphate. But now, Joshua Landis says, Washington must make a decision: "Will it stay in Northern Syria to defend the gains of the Syrian Democratic Forces that it has armed, trained and propelled to victory in Raqqa and the region north of the Euphrates River?

The difficulty, as Charles Lister told me, is that "beyond fighting IS, it is sadly very hard to determine whether the US really has a Syria policy. And he says that what policy there is is full of contradictions. For example, Washington continues to say Assad must leave and that his days are numbered, and yet the US has ceased all support to anyone opposed to Assad.

If US policy could be said to be in a mess, so too could that of Turkey. Ankara's goal, says Joshua Landis, is to retrench. He believes that President Erdogan "must make sure that the Kurdish question in Turkey does not lurch toward civil war.

He will increasingly normalise relations with Assad in order to contain the independence of Syria's Kurds.